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We investigate improvements to authentication on mobile touchscreen phones and present a novel extension to the widely used
touchscreen pattern lockmechanism. Our solution allows including nodes in the gridmultiple times, which enhances the resilience
to smudge and other forms of attack. For example, for a smudge pattern covering 7 nodes, our approach increases the amount of
possible lock patterns by a factor of 15 times. Our concept was implemented and evaluated in a laboratory user test (𝑛 = 36).The test
participants found the usability of the proposed concept to be equal to that of the baseline pattern lock mechanism but considered
it more secure. Our solution is fully backwards-compatible with the current baseline pattern lock mechanism, hence enabling easy
adoption whilst providing higher security at a comparable level of usability.
1. Introduction
For an authentication scheme, the balance between its ease
of use and its security is a critical factor determining its suit-
ability for a particular application. Smartphones hold a large
amount of private information, from personal photographs,
to text messages, email, social media, and the possible access
to the user’s finances. Even considering that physical access to
the device is needed to operate the device lock mechanism,
ignoring remote vulnerabilities, the need for a secure lock
mechanism is clear. This paper focuses on lock mechanisms
for mobile devices, particularly touchscreen smartphones.
Research in the domain of usable security in general [1]
acknowledges that there is a tension between security, user
needs, and acceptance of these mechanisms and suggests
design guidelines. One recommendation is to use the “path of
least resistance,” that is, to match the most comfortable way
to do tasks.
The typical usage context of smartphones has the user
unlock their phones many times a day. Harbach et al. [2]
report a daily average of 47.8 unlocks. Often this unlocking
occurs in situations where the user is physically encumbered
or cognitively loaded with other tasks; thus one-handed use,
as shown in Figure 4, is desirable. In fact, in most cases the
unlocking action is an annoying precursor to the user’s actual
goals. This, along with many other factors, limits acceptance
of complex yet secure locking mechanisms [3, 4]. Koved
et al. [5] state that, “When end-users’ perceptions of risk
are not aligned with those on which the system is based,
there is a mismatch in perceived benefit, leading to poor
user acceptance of the technology.” In practice the situation
may be somewhat more complex, as users’ perceptions of
the security provided by a password mechanism may be
somewhat different from the actual level provided [6].
Though, it is generally accepted that formost users raising
awareness on security, especially on mobile devices, is a
challenging, yet important task [7]. Put simply, if an action is
too much effort for the expected outcome, acceptance is low
[4]. Asking for usable and secure authentication seems, as De
Luca and Lindqvist [8] state, too much. We therefore argue
that a minimal extension to a well-accepted method could
increase security without lowering perceived usability.
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Figure 1: Pair-wise comparison of the proposed lock mechanisms to the standard pattern lock. In each illustration, the unlock action starts
at node “1” and ends at the large red dot. (a) In the multiselect condition, the “2” is added to the pattern by moving over a previously selected
node. (b) In the time-select condition, a second “3” is added to the pattern. “Long-press” allows the current node to be reselected and added
to the pattern.
Priorwork both evaluates the performance of pattern lock
mechanisms and proposes improved or alternative locking
procedures. The acceptance and performance of a locking
mechanism are highly sensitive to small conceptual changes,
if we consider the high number of unlocks that users perform
each day.The unlocks often occur in split-attention scenarios
or second-task conditions, for example, when users quickly
read an instant message whilst rushing to a train on the way
to work. Touchscreen interaction itself is in general subject
to a certain level of errors and accidental touches, which will
also play a role in any touchscreen based unlocking process
[9].
Our concept is illustrated in Figure 1. As the basis of our
concept, we extend the pattern lock mechanism by enabling
each node in a 3 × 3 grid to be used multiple times, including
the repetition of a node directly after it has been used. This
enhances the current baseline pattern lock mechanism that
allows each node to be included in the pattern only once.
We therefore propose a subtle variation in the task, which
introduces a significant conceptual change. In contrast to
other variations of stroke-based passwords, we specifically
address one-handed input, acknowledging the context of a
primary task as trigger for the unlock action.
In our research we implement and evaluate improve-
ments to the pattern lock mechanism that aim to increase its
resilience to a variety of attack methods, whilst at the same
time maintaining the full usability of the baseline method.
Our particular focus is on evaluating the method in a typical
usage context. We specifically,
(i) introduce novel enhancements to the current pattern
lock mechanism; it becomes more resilient particu-
larly against smudge attacks, whilst fully preserving
the usability benefits of the current mechanism, for
example, concerning one-handed use; additionally,
the method provides a fully backwards-compatible
user experience with the standard pattern lock proce-
dure, requiring only little learning or adaption from
the user;
(ii) evaluate the enhanced mechanism in a user study,
focusing on both the advances in usability and the
perception of security improvements.We also explore
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Figure 2: The default Android grid lock, showing a lock pattern for
a 3 × 3 grid.
if this is achieved by the actual user codes within the
scheme.
The paper is structured as follows. We first give an overview
on the state of the art on lock mechanisms and then relate
our approach to other touch-based, drawmetric approaches.
We then describe the experimental setup and the qualitative
and quantitative results. We close with a discussion of
implications and future lines of work.
2. State of the Art and Related Work
We begin with a short summary of the state of the art on
lock mechanisms in general and stroke-based unlocking in
specific. Also, we address potential attacks for these methods.
We then discuss and relate to existing work on the design
space of pattern lock mechanisms to situate our proposed
extension.
2.1. Unlock Mechanisms. An overview of the wider area of
graphical password mechanisms is provided by Biddle et al.
[11]. The design space for graphical passwords is described
by Schaub et al. [12], who evaluate the key parameters of
several approaches and offer guidelines for the designers of
such mechanisms.
A variety of unlocking mechanisms exist for granting
access to smartphones. This includes PIN code entry, textual
passwords, action-based unlocking, such as tapping [13],
shaking [14, 15], or transferring the lock-state from another
device [16], and biometric authentication such as fingerprint
or facial recognition [17]. Biometric methods especially lack
widespread acceptance amongst users due to various reasons,
such as the inability to change biometric attributes [18].
We therefore especially aimed to sustain acceptance whilst
increasing the security of the lock mechanism.
The pattern lock mechanism (see Figure 2), which we
focus our work on, is a so-called graphical password. It was
amongst the first mechanisms to substitute the PIN entry,
offering an acceptable balance between security and usability
[2]. In Figure 2, the standard grid consists of 3×3nodes (𝑛 ×𝑚
in the general case) on which the user makes a single stroke
gesture starting fromonenode andpassing through a number
of other nodes. Each node can be included only once, and
hence the maximum pattern length includes 9 nodes. Lifting
the finger from the screen completes the stroke gesture and
enters the passcode, without the need for further interaction.
It should be noted that although it is possible to pass over a
node several times, it is only included in the pattern the first
time it is passed over. For example, a pattern may start on
node 2 (top row,middle), move to node 3 (top row, right), and
then end on node 1 (top row, left), passing over the previously
selected node 2 in the process. In this case the entered code
will be “2 3 1”.
The mean unlock time for the standard Android pattern
lock has been measured as 1.4 seconds, for user selected
patterns [19]. Studies considering its usability are generally
rather limited; in particular we were unable to find detailed
studies that evaluated the mechanism in one-handed use or
real-world usage contexts. It may be noted that inmany of the
concepts presented as improvements to the baseline pattern
lock, relatively high unlock times have been reported. For
example, Chiang and Chiasson [20] report 15 seconds and
De Luca et al. [21] ≤ 4 seconds. It may be speculated that, for
current users of the standard pattern lock mechanism, such
increases would make migration to the proposed concepts
unlikely.
2.2. Potential Attacks. Any specific lock mechanism, or com-
bination thereof, has its specific attack vector. Basic attacks
such as brute force and dictionary based guessing, where a
list of higher probability passwords is used by attackers to
reduce the number of attempts needed to guess a password,
can also be applied to lock patterns. Brute force exhaustive
search, dictionary-based explorations, overlooking, social
engineering, and recovery from postinspection have been
presented and partially are applicable to pattern lock, too.
Whilst the theoretic “password” space for lock patternsmight
appear larger than a 4-digit PIN, this does not withstand
reality checks [12]. Depending on restrictions (e.g., can a
node appear twice in a pattern), the array (e.g., 𝑚 × 𝑛 dots),
and sociocultural aspects (e.g., starting at the top left for
many western users), the actual passwordmight be weak, like
“0000” as a PIN number [22]. Moreover, Biddle et al. [11]
discuss 25 mechanisms concluding that graphical passwords
are in general more vulnerable to shoulder surfing attacks
than alphanumeric passwords. Additionally, they point out
that many of the reviewed graphical password systems lack
rigorous evaluation in security and usability. In addition to
shoulder surfing attacks [21, 23], the pattern lock mechanism
is vulnerable to smudge based attacks [19, 24–26], where
physical residues from finger strokes on the touchscreen
provide attackers with clues as to the password.
The theoretical password space refers to the total set of
all possible password combinations which can be produced
by a password scheme and hence the inherent strength of
the scheme. The total is reported in binary as the number
of bits. The password space of the standard Android 3 × 3
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grid lock is 18 bits [24], which is approximately equal to a 5-
digit PIN code. Based on a simulated study, average lengths
of pattern lock codes were found to be between 6.19 and 6.64
nodes, for “easy-to-remember” and “hard-to-guess” patterns,
respectively [10].
Several authors have made detailed studies of the varia-
tion of patterns used by users [10, 27, 28], concluding that
the variety of patterns is relatively limited. Here, for example,
studies have reported that many users started their patterns
from the top left node, Andriotis et al. [10] reporting 52% and,
in a paper based study,Uellenbeck et al. [28] 44%.This limited
range of used codes makes this lock mechanism susceptible
to dictionary based guessing attacks. Following up this work,
Aviv and Fichter [27] identify particular password pattern
elements that users perceived as contributing to create a high
security password.
There is a large body of related work motivated by the
susceptibility of the standard pattern lock mechanism to
smudge attacks, for example, [10, 19, 24, 26, 27]. Various
approaches to overcome this problem have been explored, an
overview of which is presented later in this section.
2.3. Design Space for Pattern Lock Mechanisms. We discuss
selected extensions and variations of the pattern lock mech-
anism, each addressing specific limitations thereof with the
overall intention to increase the security of the pattern.
2.3.1. Strength Meters. Based on their analysis of perceived
and actual pattern strength, Andriotis et al. [22] and Sun et
al. [29] investigated the display of a strength meter, known
from text-based passwords, and its effect on the passwords
selected by users. Here, the users increased the complexity
of their patterns when the strength meter was present, hence
leading to an increased level of security.
2.3.2. Alternative Node Patterns. A rather straightforward
approach is simply to increase the number of nodes used in
the scheme; for example, Chiang and Chiasson [20] used a
5×7 grid as part of the solution they evaluated. However, this
increased density may lead to a reduction in the one-handed
usability of the unlocking mechanism.
In their tiny lock concept Kwon and Na [19] present a
minimally sized 3 × 3 grid input area and a larger copy of
the grid that provides visual feedback.When combinedwith a
final circular unlocking stroke that creates amasking smudge,
Kwon andNa report that an attackerwas unable to deduce any
passwords from the smudge patterns on the screen. However,
we assume that the increased visual feedback makes the
system more susceptible to shoulder surfing attacks.
With the aim of providing a wider range of user-defined
password patterns, in their paper based study Uellenbeck
et al. [28] evaluated a wide variety of alternative node grid
layouts, for example, a 3 × 3 square layout with the top
left node missing, as well as circular patterns. Shin et al.
[30] also briefly introduced a circular pattern arrangement
of 6 nodes. In this scheme, each node may be used up to
7 times, changing color at each reuse. Although this has
some similarities with our concept regarding reselection,
few details of the implementation are given and no user
evaluation is presented.
2.3.3. Moving Patterns. Concepts where the position of the
pattern grid is translated to a different position, scale, and
rotation on the screen for each unlock attempt have been
explored by Schneegass et al. [25] and von Zezschwitz et al.
[26]. However, they reported that users experienced difficulty
in locating the grid, due to its varying location.
2.3.4. Rhythm-Based Approaches. To address the smudge and
shoulder surfing attack problems Kim et al. [31] and Lee
et al. [32] propose mechanisms based only on the amount
of time the finger is in contact with the touchscreen. For
example, code entry may consist of a rhythmic sequence of
touch events lasting 3 sec, 2 sec, 3 sec, and 1 sec, followed by
pressing an enter button to enter the code. Here, the taps may
bemade at any position on the device screen, for example, at a
single position.Whilst this solution clearly solves the smudge
issue and may offer advantages in terms of semiblind use, its
practical usability has not been established as currently no
user evaluation has been presented. Somewhat similar solu-
tions have been proposed using the accelerometer contained
in the device to recognize a sequence of rhythmic taps on
the device body [1]. The rhythm-based enhancement that we
put forward offers similar security and usability whilst being
resilient against shoulder surfing attacks.
2.3.5. Other Approaches. Chiang and Chiasson [20] present a
multilayered drawing lock mechanism. Here warp cells at the
corners of the grid enable more complex patterns by using
multiple layers. For example, when a warp cell is touched as
part of pattern entry, a second empty grid layer is displayed
obscuring the original grid layer, on which the pattern entry
can continue. When evaluated in a comparative user study,
Chiang and Chiasson [20] conclude that their mechanism
outperforms the “Draw a Secret” lock mechanism. However,
as earlier noted, the density of the 5 × 7 grid pattern and
unlock times of 15 to 18 seconds make its usage in realistic
one-handed contexts questionable.
Acknowledging the users’ reluctance to check for threats,
Riedl et al. [33] propose to have different zones on their
mobile phone. Each zone is basically equivalent to a virtual
machine that is separated from the others. This approach
divides everyday activities, such as surfing the web, from
sensitive activities, such as home banking. As a response to
shoulder surfing attacks De Luca et al. [13] add a touch panel
on the back of smartphone, such that the user can split their
unlocking gestures between the two sides of the device. Here,
unlock times ≤ 4 seconds are reported.
Recently Apple [34, 35] has disclosed patent applications
for pattern lock approaches. Ideas include changing the color
and length of the visible finger trace depending on the
speed, duration, and complexity of the gesture, inclusion
of a strength indicator, and making certain nodes visible
only after other nodes are touched. The latter concept per-
haps have similarity to Chiang and Chiasson’s warp cells
[20].
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A promising approach to protect smartphones against
most attacks is the usage of behavioral biometrics. Here, an
additional layer of security during authentication is added.
Users show individual differences in how they enter their
patterns such as speed of entry or size of the finger contact
area on the screen. De Luca et al. were one of the first to
put forward the idea of implicit authentication in the realm
of lock patterns [36]. With two user studies, they provided
evidence that distinguishing users by behavioral biometrics is
feasible and significantly adds to security. Extending this idea,
multimodal approaches for authentication are on the rise.
For example, Google has been working on Project Abacus
that targets eliminating the need for explicit authentication
(https://goo.gl/G0K2bu, last accessed July 10, 2016). More-
over, as several smartphone devices on the market have
introduced force sensing touchscreens, we assume that future
research will investigate the performance of force touch,
providing another dimension to a pattern without requiring
an extension in length.
3. Concept and Implementation
WechoseGoogle’s Android platform as basis for our research.
The current Android grid-based pattern lock allows each
node in the pattern to be selected only once. To extend the
mechanism, we introduce two solutions where nodes may be
selected multiple times.
3.1. Concept. In our approach this multiple selection may be
achieved in one of two ways.
(i) Sequential Duplication. When drawing the pattern,
the path may go back over nodes that are already
included. In this paper we refer to this as “multise-
lect.”
(ii) Time-Based Duplication. When a user drawing the
lock pattern pauses on a node for more than a
threshold time, that node is again entered into the
pattern sequence (cf. key repeat on keyboards). In this
paper we refer to this as “time-select.” In our initial
implementation a time threshold of 600ms was used.
By enabling node duplication in lock patterns we address the
susceptibility to smudge and shoulder surfing attacks, which
has been reported as one of the core security problems of the
basic pattern lock mechanism. Additionally, we extend the
possible password code length beyond the current maximum
length of 9, providing more secure passwords to those users
that require it. Figure 3 shows an example where the intro-
duction of a single reselected or duplicated node increases the
number of combinations that a smudge attacker would need
to try from 2 to 30 (2 baseline patterns, plus 14 multiselect
patterns, plus 14 time-select patterns), that is, a factor of
15 times. When multiple reselections and duplications are
considered, this results in a many fold increase of the amount
of permutations an attacker would need to try, essentially


































Figure 3: Additional lock code ambiguity is introduced by a single
reselected or duplicated node selection based on a start smudge
pattern. The red line visualizes the lock path defining the respective
pattern.
Figure 4: Our Android prototype allows users to experiment with
the proposed lock mechanism.The smaller red dot (top right node)
has been selected once, whereas the larger red dots (center column)
have been selected twice.
A key tenet of our solution is that it is fully backwards-
compatible with the existing Android pattern lock mech-
anism. It retains the basic 9-node grid presentation and
users who do not wish to take the additional features into
use can continue to use their existing patterns. In contrast
to other proposed enhancements to pattern lock, such as
relocating or resizing the grid, our approach maintains the



















Figure 5: Length of lock patterns created by participants using the
enhanced lock mechanism.
well-accepted aspects in pattern lock mechanisms. This is
in line with our goal of providing usable security with as
little as possible additional burden or perceived effort on the
user side. Moreover, our solution maintains the simplicity of
the basic lock mechanisms, supporting passwords of various
lengths, without the need to confirm the entry by clicking a
separate enter key.
Although our solution is extensible to larger node pat-
terns beyond the 3×3 grid, we aim to retain this configuration.
We speculate that increasing the grid size to 4 × 4 and above
creates an increase in the required input accuracy that reduces
the usability of the mechanism in realistic contexts.
3.2. Implementation. We implemented our extended pattern
lock concept as a standalone Android application. The
application allowed enabling both the sequential and time-
based node duplication individually or in combination. The
prototype enabled multiple reselections to be made in a
pattern; that is, several nodes in the pattern can be selected
more than once. In our implementation each node could
be reselected a maximum of 3 times, each reselection being
visually indicated with an increased size dot. The application
included 3 modes, free interaction, set code, and unlock.
Essential aspects of our implementation are the visualiza-
tion applied to duplicated node entry and haptic feedback. As
we aim to allow semiblind usage, that is, without continuously
looking at the device display during the entry, the purpose of
the visualization is predominantly to support users’ learning
the mechanism. Thus we increased the size of the dots
with the number of times that it had been included in
the entered pattern; see Figure 5. Similarly to the current
Android lock pattern, when each node was selected a pulse
of vibration feedback was given using the device’s inbuilt
vibration mechanism. This was also identical in the case
where a node was entered based on time delay; that is, when
selecting the node for the first time by moving over it, a vibra
pulse was given, and then if the user had not moved from
the same target within the time entry window, a second vibra
pulse was given and the node entered to the pattern for a
second time. The application included detailed interaction
logging, such that the motion and duration of each lock or
unlock interaction stroke were logged to a text file stored on
the device.
3.3. Research Questions. As an overall target, we aim to
ascertain if users would actually like to take our extended
pattern lock mechanism into use in practice, replacing their
currently used lock mechanism. More specifically, we aim to
answer the following research questions:
(RQ1) Are users able to understand and successfully use a
pattern lock mechanism extended with multi- and
time-select features?
(RQ2) Are the multi- and time-select features perceived as
more secure by users?
(RQ3) Do the multi- and time-select features fully maintain
the usability benefits of the baseline pattern lock
mechanism, for example, speed of use, regarding
memorability and one-handed and semiblind usage?
4. User Study and System Evaluation
4.1. Study Design. The test process included the following
phases, adding up to about 20 minutes per participant:
(1) Signing a consent form and completing a background
questionnaire, including information on their moti-
vation for using a lockingmechanismand experiences
with their currently used lock mechanism
(2) Familiarization with using each of the three features:
normal node selection, multiselect, and time-select.
Each feature was demonstrated to the participant in
turn, after which they experimented with each by
setting and using 2 lock patterns utilizing that feature
(3) Creating a personal lock pattern that they would use
in practice: setting it and unlocking the device with it
4 times
(4) Completing a final exit questionnaire: this probed
participants’ reasoning for the choices they had made
in selecting their pattern
(5) Returning after approximately one hour to unlock
the device using the pattern they defined earlier: this
phase was completed only for a subset of participants,
due to participants’ availability.
For the user study a Moto G smartphone running Android
5.0 was used as the test device. Tests were conducted with
the participants standing, and they were instructed to hold
and interact with the device as they would when typically
unlocking a smartphone. The test moderator noted how the
device was held and interacted with.
4.1.1. Participants. We recruited 36 participants (20 females,
16 males), having a mean age of 35 years (SD = 14). Of
the participants, 6 were left-handed. The participants were
randomly recruited at the university campus by personal
invitation and were compensated with a gift of a small candy
bar. Participants were informed about the scope of the study
and consent for participation was obtained.
Regarding smartphone usage, 35/36 participants owned
a smartphone. They reported to have had it for 1.8 years on
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average (SD = 1.1). About half (15/36) used Android devices,
whilst others used iOS (9/36), Windows Phone (8/36), Jolla
(2/36), and Bada (1/36). The security mechanism currently
used by most users was PIN-based authentication (12/36),
followed by Android pattern lock (7/36) and fingerprint
based authentication (4/36). Nine of the participants (9/36)
did not use any lock mechanism, considering they did not
have any secure data on their device or rely on physical
security.
4.1.2. Reasons for Using Current Lock Mechanism. Inquiring
the reason for selecting their current lock mechanism, 9/36
mentioned that it was the default mechanism on their
smartphone, and they had not considered alternatives. Speed
and ease of use were the main drivers, being mentioned by
5/36 and 6/36 participants, respectively. Related to this 2/36
participants commented that they were simply too lazy to use
a lockmechanism. One participant noted ease of one-handed
use as a particular requirement.
Ease of memorizing was mentioned by 2/36, here the
participants noting that they used the same 4-digit PIN also
for other systems. Four participants praised the biometric
fingerprint lock mechanism they were using for its lack
of need to remember anything. The security of the used
mechanism was only mentioned as a consideration by 2/36
participants. In this respect one participant commented that
he relied on the physical security of his device and thus did
not see the need for additional security via an on-device lock
mechanism.
5. Results
5.1. Personalized Lock Pattern. The lock patterns created by
the test participants are presented in Table 1. Examining
the user-defined patterns created by the participants, the
multiselect feature was utilized by 75% of participants and
time-select by 56%. All participants chose to use at least one
of the extension features and 31% included both multi- and
time-select. Interestingly, 31% of participants chose to include
a duplicated time-selected node at the end of their patterns.
Of the participants utilizing multiselect, approximately
half (48%) used it several times (between 2 and 6 times)
in their patterns. This suggests that the penalty for repeated
use is relatively low. The repeated use of time-select was less
frequent, with 35% of the patterns that utilized it doing so
more than once. In this case the 600ms time penalty is clearly
a deterrent from repeated use. Accordingly, the highest usage
of time-select in a single pattern was 3 times.
Lock pattern lengths of between 5 and 15 nodes were used
with a mean length of 7.5 nodes (SD = 2.6). Patterns of 7
nodes in length were most popular; see Figure 5. Extremely
long patterns of more than 11 nodes in length were rare, with
only 3 participants creating patterns including 15 nodes.
When describing the reason for creating their lock code,
the main drivers mentioned were the following: ease of
remembering (42%), security (22%), easy to enter (19%),
and fast to enter (17%). Related to the memorability, 22% of
























Figure 6: The usage frequency of nodes in participants’ selected
patterns for the enhanced lock mechanism.
a letter or shape, for example, “My middle initial twice” (#16)
and “A heart shape, starting from the middle node” (#9).
Many participants (36%) commented that the pattern
they had selected was, for them, a balance between speed
and security: “An easy to remember, simple pattern that is
however difficult to hack” (#30) and “The pattern is such
that it is not easy to guess, but is quite fast to make” (#14).
Interestingly, one participant commented that the speed of
entrywas one contributor to the resilience to shoulder surfing
attacks, “. . . fast to enter, making it tricky for others to see it.”
(#22).
Some users (6%) used patterns that were extensions of
the current lock pattern they were using, commenting, for
example, “The same code I am using in my current device,
however I added 2 repeated nodes.” (#4) and “As a basis I
used the code I use on my own phone, but I took advantage
of the extra features in the test phone.” (#2).
5.2. Resilience to Guessing Attack. The frequency of node
usage in selected lock patterns is one factor affecting the ease
with which an attacker can guess lock patterns. For example,
with the standard pattern lockmechanism [22] identified that
52% of patterns begin on node 1.
Figure 6 shows the frequency of node usage as the start
node and end node and as any node in the lock pattern. It can
be noted that the frequency of node 1 as a start node has been
markedly reduced compared to the standard lockmechanism
case reported in [22], 33% compared to 52%.
To examine if our enhanced mechanism had introduced
more variation in the nodes used in the code we followed
the approach of Andriotis et al. [10] and calculated Shannon
entropy for the codes created by the participants. Table 2
presents the analysis for start nodes, end nodes, and all nodes.
5.3. Unlocking Performance
5.3.1. Initial Unlock. After deciding on a lock pattern and
setting it the participants then proceeded to unlock the device
4 times. The mean time for participants to unlock the device
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Table 1: Lock codes chosen by test participants and mean unlock times. Node numbering refers to the position in the 3 × 3 grid; left to right,
top row: 1, 2, 3, middle row: 4, 5, 6, and bottom row 7, 8, 9.
Participant Lock code (node number) Number of nodes Multiselect Time-select Mean unlock time(ms)
Unlock time after one hour
(ms)
1 5789512355 10 x x 2458 2422
2 862112686 9 x x 2193
3 75357 5 x 617
4 965369 6 x 1019
5 3214566987 10 x 2772
6 7856322 7 x 2522
7 74123698755 11 x x 3079
8 2547856 7 x 2590 2706
9 5236987455 10 x x 3090 3488
10 14745258563 11 x 2148 2373
11 86248654 8 x 1414 1546
12 775321599 9 x x 3992
13 3545853 7 x 1420 599∗
14 753258 6 x 831
15 6655884 7 x 3362
16 1123357899 10 x 2225
17 1144778 7 x 3385
18 125695 6 x 1739 1488
19 11256988 8 x 3063
20 123558 6 x 1933 ∗∗
21 156248963214789 15 x 2587 2466
22 15987532 8 x 1262 1298
23 744145636965852 15 x x 4259 3472
24 541258965 9 x 1596
25 147456369 9 x 1374
26 321456987789654 15 x x 4171
27 369955 6 x 2534
28 8523654 7 x 1526
29 36989 5 x 708 743
30 6588966 7 x x 2405
31 4585655 7 x x 1657
32 368414863 9 x 2316 2493∗
33 1245788 7 x 2399
34 753695147 9 x 1261
35 114123 6 x x 2475
36 14785589 8 x x 2407
∗At second attempt. ∗∗Failed to unlock after 5 attempts.
was 2.2 seconds (SD = 0.9 seconds). To examine if there
was any dependency of unlock time on the pattern length,
a Pearson correlation coefficient was calculated, returning a
value of 𝑅 = −0.1144. This indicates that there is no notable
correlation between the number of nodes in the pattern and
the time taken to unlock the device.
Participants that used the time-select feature in their lock
pattern had somewhat longer lock times (M = 2.8 s, SD =
0.7 s) than participants that did not utilize the time-select
feature (M = 1.5 s, SD = 0.6 s). This was expected due to
the 600ms delay required to insert a node in the pattern with
the time-select feature.
5.3.2. Unlock after One Hour. Of the participants 13 returned
after approximately one hour to unlock the device using the
code they had previously set. At this point 10/13 unlocked
the device at first attempt, 2/13 unlocked the device at second
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Table 2: Shannon entropy for nodes used in the lock pattern. A
value of 3.00 indicates that there is no bias towards particular nodes
and that all nodes are used equally. ∗ = exact values not provided.
Standard pattern lock
(Andriotis et al. [10]) Enhanced lock mechanism
Start nodes 2.35 2.68
End nodes 3∗ 2.92
All nodes 3∗ 2.97









Figure 7: Mean subjective ratings for the user’s current and the
enhanced lock mechanism. Error bars indicate standard error of
mean. ∗ = significant difference 𝑝 < .05.
attempt, and one user was unable to unlock the device within
an allowed maximum of 5 attempts.
5.4. Subjective Ratings and Qualitative Comments. The par-
ticipants’ responses to the subjecting rating questions are
shown in Figure 7. A Wilcoxon signed rank test indicated
that there was a significant difference between the perceived
security of the current lock mechanism used by partici-
pants and the enhanced lock mechanism (𝑍 = −2.149,
𝑝 = .032). There was no significant difference in either the
ease of memorability or speed of use between current and
enhanced mechanisms (𝑍 = −1.946, 𝑝 = .052 and 𝑍 =
−1.134, 𝑝 = .297, resp.).
Considering the use of multiselect and time-select fea-
tures, on a scale of 1 (would not use) to 5 (would use) par-
ticipants mean rating for multiselect was 4.0 (SD = 1.1) and
for time-select 3.2 (SD = 1.2). Examining the participants’
qualitative comments regarding the enhanced mechanism,
11/36 participants highlighted the improved security of the
multiselect feature as beneficial. The speed of operation was
clearly an important issue with 7/36 participants praising the
speed and naturalness of multiselect, whilst 6/36 considered
the time-select as slow. Additionally, 9/36 felt the time-
select required too much concentration or was too error
prone.
Negative comments on the enhanced mechanism were,
for example, that it added complexity (mentioned by 2/36
participants) and that biometric based mechanisms were
more effective (2/36 participants). Additionally, one partic-
ipant wished for clearer visualization of the multiple selected
nodes.
6. Discussion
6.1. Increment to Pattern Lock. Overall our extensions to the
pattern lock mechanism were well received, with all of our
test participants being able to use both multiselect and time-
select additions without problems. When selecting their own
lock all of the participants selected to include at least one of
the enhancements to the baseline pattern lock mechanism in
their pattern.
Longer lock patterns are more secure against brute force
attack; for our enhancedmechanism the mean pattern length
used by study participants was 7.5 nodes (SD = 2.6). This
compares to the mean pattern length of 6.6 nodes (SD = 1.9)
reported by [10], for the standard pattern lock mechanism.
Similarly, the larger variation in start node seen in our study,
compared to the standard lock mechanism [10], improves
resilience against dictionary type attacks. Thus overall our
enhanced pattern lock mechanism is more secure than the
baseline pattern lock mechanism.
Additionally, it should be noted that the general increase
the overall code space and code variation introduced by the
enhancements also provides an increase in reliance to attack
for those users that do not choose to utilize the extension
features in their lock pattern.
6.2. Unlocking Performance
6.2.1. Time to Unlock. Themeasured mean unlocking time of
2.2 seconds (SD = 0.9) compares favorably to the unlocking
times reported for the standard pattern lock mechanism for
example, 1.4 seconds [19]. It should be noted that considering
the use of the multiselect feature only, that is, excluding
the time-select feature, the mean unlock time of feature 1.5
seconds (SD = 0.6) is directly comparable to that reported
for the baseline mechanism. Further, the measured unlock
times fall well below the values reported by other proposals
to improve the pattern lock mechanism [20, 21]. It should
also be noted that much of the prior work in the area does
not include a user study and thus presents no information on
actual usability of the mechanisms.
6.2.2. Memorability. Even though the codes used by many of
our study participants were rather long (M = 7.5 nodes, SD =
2.6), largely participants had no difficulty memorizing them.
As noted by several of the participants, the possibility to select
nodes multiple times gave the possibility to draw letters and
shapes, thus creating a memorable lock pattern. This can be
compared to normal handwriting, where many letters such
as “b,” “k,” and “p” require passing over the same point more
than once.
6.3. Backwards Compatibility. Our results indicate that, if
made available as part of the default device lock mechanism,
the adoption rate of enhancements would be high. Here, the
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fact that it is a backwards-compatible extension to the existing
lock mechanism appears to reduce the adoption threshold
for many users, for example, participants’ comments on
using variations of their existing lock pattern. Based on the
currently widespread usage of the pattern lock mechanism
and the large amount of work that has been motivated by
its limitations, we feel that our work has potential to be of
direct practical benefit in providing improved security to
smartphone users.
6.4. Balancing Security and Usability. Usable security is con-
cerned with providing users with “acceptable” procedures
whilst trying to ensure a basic level of security. For pattern
lock mechanisms, the topic of smudge attacks received great
attention and numerous publications, as detailed in the
related work section of this paper.
Althoughprior research on the area has introduced awide
variety of alternative concepts aiming to address the security
limitations of the pattern lock method, these have to date
also resulted in somewhat reduced usability. We also note
that many of the concepts proposed are either unevaluated
in a user study or have not been evaluated considering
one-handed or semiblind device usage. Noting that none of
the proposals of prior research have yet gained widespread
adoption, we hypothesize that one of the reasons is that
the proposed solutions, whilst increasing security, result in
a decrease in usability compared to the current solution.
We contrast this with our approach to provide a moderate
increase in resilience to attack, without compromising the
usability of the standard solution.
6.5. Limitations. We acknowledge that our work is limited by
our small sample size and laboratory setting. However, as the
general idea of our concept was immediately understood by
the majority of our test participants we believe they were well
able to immediately reflect on its usage in everyday in-the-
wild contexts. As future work, we intend to conduct the study
in a larger context to address effects on the measure variables
and statistical effects.
7. Conclusion
We have created a touchscreen locking mechanism that
extends the widely used pattern lock mechanism, improving
its resilience to attack. In the case of smudge based attacks our
approach increases the code space for a particular smudge
pattern by a factor of 15 times. Evaluation of our concept
in a user test (𝑛 = 36) revealed that users considered it
more secure than their currently used lock mechanism, yet
equal in its speed of use and memorability. The mean time
taken to unlock the device using the enhanced mechanism
was 2.2 seconds (SD = 0.9). For patterns including only the
multiselect feature themean unlock time of 1.5 seconds (SD =
0.6) is equivalent to those reported for the standard pattern
lock mechanism.
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